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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

TAMRA M. MARTIN,
Petitioner and Appellant,

Case No. 20071017-CA

vs.
Priority No.
ANTHONY NEIL COLONNA,
Respondent and Appellee.

BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE, ANTHONY NEIL COLONNA

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellee agrees with Appellant that this court has jurisdiction to hear this matter.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellee does not disagree with the standards of review set forth in Appellant's
Statement of the Issues and Standards of Review, as set forth in pages one through five.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The following relevant written findings were made by the Court in its Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Dismissal of Petition for Protective Order in this matter:
1.

That the Appellant/Petitioner is the daughter of the Appellee/Respondent.

2.

That the Petitioner was "physically struck" by Respondent while her
1

parents were married and residing together.
3.

That the Petitioner and Respondent last visited with each other six years

prior to the protective order hearing, when Petitioner spent a week at Respondent's house.
4.

That the Petitioner had only seen Respondent twice within the six years

prior to the protective order hearing, with the first being four years previous and the
second occurring approximately one year later.
5.

That in approximately August 2007, Respondent telephoned Petitioner's

mother's house, where Petitioner was residing. Respondent was unaware that Petitioner
was residing at the house. Petitioner answered the phone and spoke to Respondent, who
was angry about a missing movie rental card.
6.

On October 19, 2007, Petitioner was present when Respondent had

Petitioner's mother served with an Order to Show Cause.
7.

Petitioner filed a request for a protective order four days after her mother

was served with the Order to Show Cause.
The Court further concluded that Petitioner was not a cohabitant of Respondent
when the physical abuse occurred because she was a minor child of Respondent.
The Court further concluded that there is not a substantial likelihood of domestic
violence between the parties which would justify the granting of a protective order.
//
//
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ARGUMENT
The Court did not err in Denying Appellant's Protective Order when the
abuse suffered by Appellee Occurred solely during the Appellee's Minority
Appellant argues that the Court erred in holding that Appellant is not currently a
cohabitant of Appellee. However, even if the Court erred in this matter, it did not err
when it held that Appellant was not a cohabitant within the meaning of Utah law when
any physical abuse occurred because she was a minor child of Appellee. The plain
language of the statute and public policy do not allow adults to file protective orders
against a parent solely on the basis of abuse that occurred during the child's minority.
In Bailev v. Bavles. 52 P.3d 1158, 1165 (Utah 2002), the Utah Supreme Court
stated "the statute provides two alternative grounds upon which a person may seek a
protective order." The first alternative requires a finding that there (1) was a cohabitant
who (2) was "subjected to abuse or domestic violence." Id. The second alternative
requires a finding of (1) a "substantial likelihood of abuse or domestic violence" to (2) a
cohabitant. Id. The Court explained as follows:
"Therefore, according to the statute, in order for Bailey to obtain a protective
order, she was required to show that she was a cohabitant and either than she had been
subjected to abuse or domestic violence, or that there was a substantial likelihood of
immediate danger of abuse or domestic violence to her." Id.
As to the first alternative, the Bailey decision provides that there be a two-pronged
analysis: first, whether the petitioner is a cohabitant, and secondly, that the petitioner
either had been subjected to abuse or domestic violence while a cohabitant. Appellant

3

argues that a petitioner need only be a cohabitant at the time of filing the petition, and not
when the abuse occurred. However, this point was clarified in footnote eight of the
Bailey decision when it stated,
"The controlling fact for the purposes of the statute, therefore, is not that the abuse
took place eighteen months or more prior to the filing of a petition for a protective order,
but that Bailey in fact suffered abuse at some point while she was a cohabitant." Id.
The Court went on to point out that the abuse the petitioner suffered in Bailey took
place during the marriage, such that she satisfied the required of being a cohabitant at the
time of the abuse. Thus, preliminary to the entry of a protective order under this
alternative is a finding that the abuse occurred "at some point" during the period when the
relationship was one between cohabitants. Appellant is not entitled to relief under the
first prong of the test, as the Court found she was not a cohabitant at the time that the
alleged abuse occurred.
Appellant is not Entitled to a Protective Order under the Second Bailey
Alternative
Under the second ground for obtaining a protective order under Bailey, the court
must find that at some time while the Appellant was a cohabitant, "there was a substantial
likelihood of immediate danger of abuse or domestic violence to her." Bailey at 1165. In
determining whether a substantial likelihood of danger exists, the court may weigh the
evidence in light of the totality of the circumstances. See Strollo v. Strollo, 828 P.2d 532,
534 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), in which this Court approvingly commented on a Minnesota
case, Boniek v. Boniek, 443 N.W.2d 196, 198 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), wherein the
4

Minnesota Court of Appeals approved the trial court weighing the evidence in the totality
of the circumstances to determine whether "sufficient evidence exists to infer a present
intent to inflict fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault within the
meaning of the Domestic Abuse Act." Boniek at 198 .
In the instant matter, the trial court's findings are sufficiently detailed for this
Court to hold that, under the totality of the circumstances, even if the parties were
cohabitants there was not a substantial likelihood of immediate danger to Appellant. The
Court made specific findings of the length of time that had passed between the time the
petitioner resided with the respondent and the time of the alleged incident giving rise to
the petition, and further made note of the incidental and benign nature of the limited
contact that occurred thereafter (i.e., Appellant stopped at Appellee's house during
Sunnyside Community Days to use the restroom). The Court also made a specific finding
of the fact that the protective order was filed almost immediately after Appellant's mother
was served with an Order to Show Cause by Appellee. Further, the Court did not find that
there was an intent to inflict fear of imminent physical harm. Given these findings, it was
not unreasonable for the trial court, when weighing the facts in the totality of the
circumstances, to find that there was not a threat of future harm or, as described in Bailey,
"a substantial likelihood of imminent danger of abuse or domestic violence." Bailey v.
Bayles, 52 P.3d at 1165. Thus, Appellant is not entitled to relief under the second Bailey
prong.
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Public Policy Does Not Favor Allowing an Adult to Apply for a Protective
Order Based on Abuse Suffered as Child at the Hands of a Parent
Contrary to the assertions of Appellant, an adult who was abused as a child by a
parent or some other relative is not without remedy. Once a child has reached his or her
majority, he is presumed by law to be able to be sufficiently self-determining to choose
his place of residence and with whom he will associate. Although an individual may have
been abused while a child, that individual's rights greatly enlarge upon her emancipation
at age 18, sufficiently for the legislature to presume that the individual can at that point
take steps to protect himself. If that individual thereafter suffers abuse as an adult, he
then has recourse to obtaining a protective order. By requiring that the abuse relevant to
the issue took place while an adult cohabitant, the legislature ensures that protective
orders are not granted due to faulty childhood memories or by children resentful of
parental authority.
Even if the Inadvertent Contact was Deemed to be Deliberate, the Court's
Findings are Sufficient to Find that Petitioner's Statements did not Constitute a
Threat
In her marshaling of evidence, Appellant cites to her testimony at trial, wherein she
states, "He said that he wished I weren't alive, and that I were never born, and that he
could take care of that for me.5' (Appellant's Brief, page 25; Record, page 6). Appellant
also notes that the trial court stated, "Now I have to find some intent on his part to seek
her out and threaten her.. . I don't think he sought her out to threaten her. I think the
contact was Inadvertent." (Appellant's Brief, page 23; Record, page 68)
6

Even if the trial court accepts Appellant's argument that the Inadvertent contact
was not a bar to a finding of a protective order, the Inadvertent nature of the contact is a
factor that the Court can consider in weighing the totality of the circumstances under
StroUo, and specifically, in weighing whether the nature of the statement made by
Appellee was an intentional threat. Further, other findings were made sufficient for the
Court to infer that the statements were not intentional.
The Trial Court did Not Fail to Make Factual Findings Regarding Material
Incidents of Alleged Abuse
Appellant claims that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings as to
whether a threat was made during the phone call between Appellant and Appellee.
Specifically, Appellant urges the trial court to specify whether Respondent made "an
intentional threat of imminent future harm." However, Petitioner's marshaling of facts
does not clearly indicate that she is entitled to a finding that an intentional threat was
made. No individuals other than Appellant heard Appellee's statement made over the
phone. Further, Appellant denied making any threat over the phone. Appellee did not
make the phone call for the purpose of seeking out Appellant.
Finally, Appellee's alleged statement itself is open to interpretation. He did not
use words indicating an intent to take action, but merely stated that he "wished" Appellant
and not been bom and that he "could take care of that for her." Conditional words of this
nature can carry more than one meaning and do not necessarily connote a clear intention
to take action or to place Appellant in reasonable fear of imminent physical harm.
7

Appellant did not seek a protective order until nearly two months after the incident took
place, it appears that she did not treat them as such. Given the totality of the
circumstances and the lack of independent verification of the statements made, the trial
court was within its rights to make no further findings beyond one that Appellee was
angry during the phone call
It is not necessary in this instance for the appellate court to look beyond the
findings of the court to marshal evidence, as the findings of the court are clearly sufficient
to find that in fact Petitioner did not meet her burden in showing that she suffered abuse
while a cohabitant, and was not in danger of a substantial likelihood of imminent danger
of abuse or domestic violence. Appellant faults the Court for failing to make findings as
to allegations of past abuse occurring during the minority of the Appellant. Because these
incidents took place prior to a relationship of cohabitation, they should not be considered
by this Court. See footnote 8, Bailev v. Bayles, 52 P.3d at 1165.
CONCLUSION
Appellee respectfully requests that this Court affirm the decision of the trial court.
DATED this J > A l a y of July, 2008

/ JA

Christian B. Bryner
Attorney for Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ^ " t ^ d a y of July, 2008,1 served a copy of the attached
Appellee's Brief upon counsel for Appellant Patricia K. Abbott, by mailing the same to
her viafirstclass mail to the following address:
Patricia Abbott
Utah Legals Services, Inc.
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